

**PRESIDENT MCKINLEY'S
ANNUAL MESSAGE.**

The National Spirit Has Been
Strengthened by the War.

A BRIEF RECITAL OF THE STRIFE.

Cubans Encouraged to Form a Government
for Themselves—Austria Still Demanding
Satisfaction for the Lattimer
Riot—Congress Urged to Act in Regard
to the Nicaragua Canal—Government
in Sympathy With the Care's Peace
Movement—Condition of the Treasury.

President McKinley's message was
submitted to Congress last Monday.
The war is carefully reviewed from
beginning to end and the president feels
grateful over the result. Our new
possessions and their future govern-
ments, as well as the history of the
war are considered in the following
message:

Washington, December 5.—The President's
message was sent to Congress
to the Senate and House of Represent-
atives:

Notwithstanding the added burdens
rendered necessary by the war, our
people are in every respect and in
steadily increasing degree of prosper-
ity, evidenced by the largest vol-
ume of business ever recorded. Man-
ufacture has been productive,
agricultural pursuits have
yielded abundant returns, labor in all
fields of industry is better rewarded,
revenue legislation passed by the pres-
ent Congress has increased the treas-
ury's receipts to the amount estimated
by its authors; the finances of the gov-
ernment have been successfully admin-
istered and its credit stands at the
first rank; while its currency has been
maintained at the world's highest
standard. Military service under a
common flag and for a righteous cause
has strengthened the national spirit
and served to cement more closely
than ever the fraternal bonds between
every section of the country.

A review of the relation of the
United States to other powers, always
appropriate, is this year of primary
importance in view of the momentous
issues which have arisen, demanding
in one instance the ultimate determi-
nation by arms and involving far-reach-
ing consequences which will inspire
the earnest attention of the Congress.

In my last message very full consid-
eration was given to the question of
the government of the United States
toward Spain and the Cuban insurrec-
tion as being by far the most impor-
tant problem with which we were then
called upon to deal. The considerations
then advanced, and the exposition of
the views therein expressed, disclosed
my sense of the extreme gravity of the
situation, leading as it did to a logically
unfounded or practically inadmissible,
the recognition of the Cuban insurrec-
tion, the neutral intervention to end the
war by imposing a rational compromise
between the contending parties, inter-
vention in favor of one or the other
party, and forcible annexation of the
island—I concluded it was honestly due
to our friendly relations with Spain
that she should be given a reasonable
chance to realize her expectations of
reform to which she had so long and so
vocally committed. Within a few weeks
previously she had announced compre-
hensive plans which it was confidently
asserted would be efficacious to remedy
the evils so deeply affecting our
country, so injurious to the true inter-
ests of the mother country, and so
repugnant to the universal sentiment of human-
ity.

The ensuing month brought little
sign of real progress toward the pacifi-
cation of Cuba. The autonomous ad-
ministration set up in the capital and
some of the principal cities appeared
not to gain the favor of the inhabitants
nor to be able to extend their influence
to the large extent of territory held by
the insurgents, while the military arm,
obviously unable to cope with the still
active rebellion, continued many of the
most objectionable and offensive poli-
cies of the government that had pre-
ceded it. No tangible relief was af-
forded the vast numbers of unhappy
reconcentrados, despite the reiterated
professions made by Spain to regard and
the amount appropriated by Spain to
that end. The proffered expedient of
zones of cultivation proved illusory;
indeed, no less practical nor more de-
lusive promises of succor could well
have been tendered to the exhausted
and destitute people of the country and
the life and home dear, and herded
in a strange region among unsympa-
thetic strangers hardly less necessities than
themselves.

MEETING A CRISIS.
By the end of December the mortal-
ity among them had frightfully in-
creased. Conservative estimates from
Spanish sources placed the deaths
among these distressed people at over
40 per cent, from the time Gen. Wey-
ler's decree of reconcentration was en-
forced. With the acquiescence of the
Spanish authorities a scheme was
adopted for relief by charitable contribu-
tions, raised in this country and dis-
tributed, under the direction of the
consul general and the several consuls,
by noble and earnest individual effort
through the organized agencies of the
American Red Cross. Thousands of
lives were thus saved, but many thou-
sands more were inaccessible to such
forms of aid.

The war continued on the old footing
without comprehensive plan, develop-
ing only the same spasmodic encoun-
ters, barren of strategic result, that had
marked the course of the earlier ten
years' rebellion as well as the present
insurrection from its start. No alterna-
tive save physical exhaustion of either
combatant, and therewithal the practical
ruin of the island, lay in
sight, but how far distant no one could
venture to conjecture.

At this juncture, on the 15th of Feb-
ruary last, occurred the destruction of
the battleship Maine, while rightfully
lying in the harbor of Havana on a
mission of international courtesy and
good will—a catastrophe the suspicious
nature and horror of which stirred the
nation's heart profoundly. It is a
striking evidence of the poise and
sturdy good sense distinguishing our
national character that this shocking
blow, falling upon a generous people,
already deeply touched by preceding
events in Cuba, did not move them to

an instant, desperate resolve to toler-
ate no longer the existence of a con-
dition of danger and disorder at our
doors that made possible such a deed,
by whomsoever wrought. Yet the in-
stant of justice prevailed, and the na-
tion anxiously awaited the result of
the searching investigation at once set
on foot. The finding of the naval
board of inquiry established that the
origin of the explosion was externally
by a submarine mine, and only but for
through lack of positive testimony, to
fix the responsibility of its authorship.

All these things carried conviction to
the most thoughtful, even before the
finding of the naval board, that a crisis
in our relations with Spain and to-
ward Cuba was at hand. So strong
was this belief that it needed but a
brief executive suggestion to the con-
gress to receive immediate answer to
the duty of making instant provision
for the possible and perhaps speedily
probable emergency of war, and the
remarkable, almost unique, spectacle
was presented of a unanimous vote of
both houses on the 9th of March ap-
propriating \$50,000,000 "for the national
defense and for each and every pur-
pose connected therewith, to be ex-
pended at the discretion of the Presi-
dent." That this act of provision came
none too soon was disclosed when the
application of the fund was undertaken.
Our coasts were practically undefended.
Our navy needed large pro-
vision for increased armaments and
supplies, and even numbers to cope
with any sudden attack from the navy
of Spain, which comprised modern ves-
sels of the highest type of continental
perfection. Our army also required en-
largement of men and munitions. The
details of the hurried preparations for
the dreaded contingency are told in the
reports of the secretaries of war and
of the navy, and need not be repeated
here. It is sufficient to say that the
breakdown of war, when it did come,
found our nation not unprepared to
meet the conflict.

PREPARING FOR HOSTILITIES.
The maximum effective fighting
force of the navy during the war, sepa-
rated into classes, was as follows:
Four battleships of the first class;
1 battleship of the second class; 2 arm-
ored cruisers; 6 coast defense monitors;
1 armored ram; 12 protected cruisers;
10 unprotected cruisers; 3 torpedo
dynamite cruisers; 11 torpedo boats;
15 vessels of the old navy, including moni-
tors, Auxiliary navy: 11 auxiliary
cruisers; 25 converted yachts; 27 con-
verted tugs; 19 converted colliers; 15
revenue cutters; 4 lighthouse tenders
and 19 miscellaneous vessels.

Much alarm was felt along our entire
Atlantic seaboard lest some attack
might be made by the enemy. Every
precaution was taken to prevent possi-
ble injury to our great cities lying
along the coast. Temporary garrisons
were provided, drawn from the State
militia; infantry and light batteries
were drawn from the volunteer force.
About 12,000 troops were thus employ-
ed. The coast signal service was es-
tablished for observing the approach
of an enemy's ships to the coast of
the United States, and the life-saving
and lighthouse services co-operated,
which enabled the Navy department
to have all portions of the Atlantic
coast, from Maine to Texas, under ob-
servation.

The auxiliary navy was created un-
der the authority of Congress and was
offered and manned by the naval mil-
itia of the several States. This or-
ganization patrolled the coast and per-
formed the duty of a second line of de-
fense.

Under the direction of the chief of
engineers, submarine mines were
placed at the most exposed points. Be-
fore the outbreak of the war, perma-
nent mining casemates and cable gal-
leries had been constructed at nearly
all important harbors. Most of the tor-
pedo material was not to be found in
the market, and had to be specially
manufactured. Under date of April 19,
district officers were directed to take
all preliminary measures, short of
the actual attaching of the loaded
mines to the cables, and on April 22,
telegraphic orders were issued to place
the loaded mines in position. The ag-
gregate number of mines placed were
1,535, at the principal harbors from
Maine to California. Preparations
were also made for the planting of
mines at certain other harbors. Be-
cause of the early destruction of the
Spanish fleet, these were not placed.

The Signal Corps was promptly or-
ganized and performed service of the
most difficult and important character.
Its operations during the war covered
the electrical connection of the coast
fortifications, the establishment of tele-
phonic and telegraphic facilities for
the camps at Manila, Santiago and in
Porto Rico. There were constructed
300 miles of line at ten great camps,
thus facilitating military movements
from those points in a manner hitherto
unknown in military administration.
Field telegraph lines were estab-
lished and maintained under the
enemy's fire at Manila, and later the
Manila-Hongkong cable was reopened.

MONEY PROVIDED BY CONGRESS.
In Porto Rico cable communications
were opened over a discontinued route,
and in the headquarters of the com-
manding officer was kept in tele-
graphic communication with the divi-
sion commanders on four different lines
of operations.

There was placed in Cuban waters a
completely outfitted cable ship, with
war cables and cable gear, suitable
both for the destruction of communi-
cations belonging to the enemy and
the establishment of our own. Two
ocean cables were destroyed under the
enemy's batteries at Santiago. The
day previous to the landing of Gen.
Shafter's corps at Calmanera, within
20 miles of the landing place, cable
communications were established and
a cable station opened, giving direct
communication with the government
at Washington. This service was
valuable to the executive in directing
the operations of the army and navy.
With a total force of over 1,200, the loss
was by disease in camp and field, offi-
cers and men included, only five.

The national defense fund of \$50,000,-
000 was expended in large part by the
army and navy, and the objects for
which it was used are fully shown in
the reports of the several secretaries.
It was a most timely appropriation,
enabling the government to strengthen
its defenses and make preparations
greatly needed in case of war.

This fund being inadequate to the
requirements of equipment and for the
conduct of the war, the patriotism of
the Congress provided the means in
the war revenue act of July 12, by au-
thorizing a 3 per cent popular loan not
to exceed \$400,000,000 and by levying
additional imposts and taxes. Of the
authorized loan, \$200,000,000 were offered
and promptly taken, the subscrip-
tions far exceeding the call and cov-
er it many times over, while pre-
ference being given to the smaller
bids, no single allotment exceeded
\$5,000. This was a most encouraging
and significant result, showing the vast
resources of the nation and the determi-
nation of the people to uphold their
country's honor.

It is not within the province of the
message to narrate the history of the
Spanish declaration of April 21, but a
brief recital of its more salient features
is appropriate. The first encounter be-

the war in point of date took place
April 27, when a detachment of the
blockading squadron made a recon-
naissance in force at Matanzas, shel-
tered by the bay, and there effected
several new works in construction.
DEWEY'S MAGNIFICENT VICTORY

The next engagement was destined to
mark a memorable epoch in maritime
warfare. The Pacific fleet, under
Commodore George Dewey, had lain
for some weeks at Hongkong. Upon
the colonial proclamation of neutrality
being issued and the customary 24
hours' notice being given, it repaired to
Mira Bay, near Hongkong, whence
it proceeded to the Philippine Islands
under telegraphic orders to capture or
destroy the formidable Spanish fleet
then assembled at Manila. At day-
break on the 1st of May the American
force entered Manila Bay, and after a
few hours' engagement effected the
total destruction of the Spanish fleet,
consisting of ten warships and a trans-
port, besides capturing the naval sta-
tion and forts at Cavite, thus annihila-
ting the Spanish naval power in the
Pacific ocean and completely controll-
ing the bay of Manila, with the ability
to take the city at will. Not a life was
lost on our ships, the wounded num-
bered only 12, and the enemy's loss was
materially injured. For this gallant
achievement the Congress, upon my
recommendation, fitly bestowed upon
the actors their preference and sub-
stantial reward.

The effect of this remarkable victory
upon the spirit of our people and upon
the fortunes of the war was instant. A
prestige of invincibility thereby at-
tached to our arms, which continued
throughout the struggle. Reinforce-
ments were hurried to Manila, under
the command of Maj. Gen. Merritt,
and firmly established within sight of
the capital, which lay helpless before
our arms.

On the 7th day of May the govern-
ment was advised officially of the
victory at Manila and of the capture
of the commander of our fleet what
troops would be required. The informa-
tion was received on the 15th day
of May, and the first army expedition
sailed May 25, and arrived off Manila
June 12, to find the Spanish fleet
followed, the total force consisting of 641
officers and 15,958 men.

Only reluctance to cause needless
loss of life and property prevented the
early storming and capture of the city.
Spain's military demonstrations were
evidence of the whole group. The in-
surgents meanwhile had resumed the
active hostilities suspended by the
uncompleted truce of December, 1897.
Their forces invested Manila from the
north and east sides, but were
constrained by Admiral Dewey and
Gen. Merritt from attempting an as-
sault. It was fitting that whatever
was done in the way of decisive opera-
tions in that quarter should be ac-
complished by the strong arm of the
United States. Obeying the stern
precept of war which enjoins the
overcoming of the adversary and the
extinction of his power wherever as-
ailable as the speedy and sure means
to win a peace, divided victory was
our enemy's ships to the coast of
the United States, and the life-saving
and lighthouse services co-operated,
which enabled the Navy department
to have all portions of the Atlantic
coast, from Maine to Texas, under ob-
servation.

THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA.
Following the comprehensive scheme
of general attack, powerful forces were
assembled at various points on our
coast to invade Cuba and Porto Rico,
and to make a demonstration of force
made at several exposed points. On
May 11 the cruiser Wilmington and
torpedo boat Winslow were unsuccess-
ful in an attempt to silence the bat-
teries at Cardenas, a gallant ensign,
Worth Bagley, and four sailors fell
bravely. The attack was
strongly enough, among the very few
which occurred during our naval
operations in this extraordinary conflict.

Meanwhile the Spanish naval pre-
parations had been pushed to their
utmost. A powerful squadron, under
Admiral Cervera, which had assembled
at the Cape Verde Islands before the
outbreak of hostilities, had crossed
the ocean, and by its erratic move-
ments in the Caribbean sea, baffled
the military plans which baffled the
pursuit of our fleets. For a time fears
were felt lest the battleship Oregon
and gunboat Marietta, nearing home
after a long voyage from San Fran-
cisco of over 15,000 miles, might be
sighted by the Spanish fleet, but their
fortunate arrival dispelled apprehensions
and lent much needed reinforcement.
Not until Admiral Cervera took refuge
in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba,
about May 19, was it practically
possible to direct a systematic
military attack upon the Antillean
possessions of Spain.

Several demonstrations occurred on
the coasts of Cuba and Porto Rico in
preparation for the larger event. On
May 13 the Atlantic squadron
under the command of Rear Admiral
Sigsbee, under the command of Rear
Admiral Schley's squadron
bombed the forts guarding the
mouth of Santiago harbor. Neither
attack had any material result. It was
evident that the Spanish fleet was
incapable to achieve a
decisive advantage.

The next act in the war thrilled not
alone the hearts of our countrymen,
but the world, by its exceptional hero-
ism. On the night of July 3, Lieut.
Hobson, aided by several other volun-
teers, blocked the narrow outlet from
Santiago harbor by sinking the collier
Merrimac in the channel, under a fierce
fire from the shore batteries, escaping
by their lives by a miracle, but falling
into the hands of the Spaniards.
It was a most gratifying incident in
the war that the bravery of this little
band of heroes was cordially appreciated
by the Spanish admiral, who sent a flag
of truce to notify Admiral Sampson
of their safety and to compliment them
on their heroic act. They were subse-
quently exchanged July 7.

By June 7 the cutting of the last
Cuban cable isolated the island. There-
after the invasion was vigorously
prosecuted. On June 10, under a heavy
protecting fire, a landing of 600 men
from the Oregon, Marblehead and
Yankee was effected in Guantanamo
bay, where it had been determined to
establish a naval station. This impor-
tant and essential port was taken
from the enemy after severe fighting
by the marines, who were the first
organized force of the United States to
land in Cuba.

**DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA'S
SQUADRON.**
The position so won was held despite
desperate attempts to dislodge our
forces. On June 22 the advance of the
invading army, under Maj. Gen. Shaf-
ter, landed at Daiquiri, about 15 miles
east of Santiago. This was accom-
plished under great difficulties, but
with marvelous dispatch. On June 23,
the movement against Santiago began.
On the 24th the first serious engage-
ment took place, in which the First
and Tenth Cavalry and the First
United States Volunteer Cavalry, Gen.
Young's brigade, Gen. Wheeler's divi-
sion, participated in a heavy fight.
By this, however, ground within five
miles of Santiago was won. The ad-
vantage was steadily increased. On
July 1 a severe battle took place, our
forces gaining the outskirts of Santi-
ago; on the 2d the city and San Juan
were taken, after a desperate charge,
and the investment of the city was
completed. The navy co-operated by
shelling the town and the coast forts

On the day following this brilliant
achievement of our land forces, July
3, occurred the decisive naval combat
of the war. The Spanish fleet attempt-
ing to leave the harbor, was met by the
American squadron, under command
of Commodore Sampson. In less than
three hours all the Spanish ships were
destroyed, two torpedo boats being
sunk, and the marine steamer Albatross,
Quinto, Vizcaya and Cristobal Colon
driven ashore. The Spanish admiral and
over 1,300 men were taken prisoners,
while the enemy's loss of life was
deplorably large, some 600 perishing.
On our side, but one man was killed,
and the Brooklyn and the man seriously
wounded. Although our ships were
repeatedly struck, not one was seriously
injured. Where all so conspicuously
distinguished themselves, from the
commodore to the gunners and the
unarmed heroes in the boiler rooms,
each and all contributing toward the
achievement of this astounding victory
for which neither ancient nor
modern history affords a parallel in the
completeness of the event and the
wonderful disproportion of casualties.
It would be invidious to single out any
for special honor. Deserved promotion
has rewarded the more conspicuous
actors—the nation's profoundest grati-
tude is due to all of these brave men
who by their skill and devotion, in a
few short hours crushed the sea power
of Spain and wrought a triumph
whose decisiveness and far-reaching
consequences can scarcely be meas-
ured. Nor can we be unmindful of the
achievements of our leaders, mecha-
nics and artisans, whose skill in the
construction of our warships.

With the catastrophe of Santiago
Spain's efforts upon the ocean virtu-
ally ceased. A spasmodic effort toward
the end of June to send her Medi-
terranean fleet, under Admiral Camara,
to relieve Manila was abandoned, the
expedition being recalled after it had
passed through the Suez canal.

THE FALL OF SANTIAGO.
The capitulation of Santiago follow-
ed. The city was closely besieged by
land, while the entrance of our ships
into the harbor cut off all relief
from the city. The evacuation of the
city for the removal of non-combatants.
Protracted negotiations continued
from July 3 to July 15, when, under
menace of immediate assault, the pre-
liminaries of surrender were agreed
upon. On July 17 the city was cap-
tured. The capitulation embraced the
entire eastern end of Cuba. The
number of Spanish soldiers surren-
dered was 22,000, all of whom were
subsequently conveyed to Spain at the
charge of the United States. The
successful campaign is told in the
report of the secretary of war, which
will be laid before you. The individ-
ual valor of officers and soldiers was
never more strikingly shown than
in the several engagements leading to
the surrender of Santiago, while the
prompt movements and successive
victories won instant and universal
applause. To those who gained this
complete triumph which established
the ascendancy of the United States
in the West Indies, the value and im-
portance of the victory is unparal-
leled. The dead claim our tears, and
our losses by battle and disease must
cloud any exultation at the result and
teach us to weigh the awful cost of
war, however rightful the cause or
signal the victory.

With the fall of Santiago, the occu-
pation of Porto Rico became the next
strategic necessity. Gen. Miles had
previously been assigned to organize
an expedition for that purpose. Fortu-
nately he was already at Santiago,
where he had arrived on the 11th of
July, with reinforcements for Gen.
Shafter's army.

Such these troops, consisting of 3,415
infantry and artillery, two companies
of engineers, one company of the Signal
Corps, Gen. Miles left Guantanamo
on July 21, having nine transports,
convoys by the fleet under Capt. Hig-
ginson, with the Massachusetts (diag-
nosing), Gloucester, Columbia and
Yale, the two latter carrying troops.
The expedition landed at Guanica, July
25, which port was entered with little
opposition. Here the fleet was joined by
the Annapolis and the Wasp, while the
Iranian and Amphitrite went to San
Juan, and joined the New Orleans,
which was engaged in blockading that
port. The major-general commanding
was subsequently reinforced by Gen.
Schwan's brigade of the Third army
corps, by Gen. Wilson, with a part
of his brigade, and also by Gen. Brooke
with a part of his corps, numbering in
all 15,673 officers and men.

On July 27 he entered Ponce, one of
the most important ports in the is-
land, from which he thereafter directed
operations for the capture of the is-
land.

With the exception of encounters
with the enemy at Guayum, Hormi-
gueres, Coamo and Yauco, and an at-
tack on a force landed at Cape San
Juan, there was no serious resistance.
The campaign was prosecuted with
great vigor, and by the last of August
much of the island was in our posses-
sion, and the acquisition of the re-
mainder was only a matter of a short
time. At most of the points in the
island our troops were enthusiastically
welcomed. Proclamations of loyalty to
the flag and gratitude for delivery from
Spanish rule met our commanders at
every stage. As a potent influence
toward peace, the outcome of the Porto
Rico operations was of great conse-
quence and generous commendation is
due to those who participated in it.

THE CAPTURE OF MANILA.
The last scene of the war was enacted
at Manila, its starting place. On Au-
gust 15, after a brief assault upon the
works by the land forces, in which the
squadron assisted, the capital sur-
rendered unconditionally. The casual-
ties were comparatively few. By this
act the conquest of the Philippine archipelago
was virtually accomplished when the Span-
ish capacity for resistance was de-
stroyed by Admiral Dewey's victory of
the 1st of May, was formally sealed.
To Gen. Merritt, his officers and men
for their uncomplaining and devoted
service, and for their gallantry in ac-
tion, the nation is sincerely grateful.
Their long voyage was made with sin-
gular success, and the soldierly con-
duct of the men, most of whom were
without previous experience in the
military service, deserves unmeasured
praise.

The total casualties in killed and
wounded in the army during the war
with Spain were: Officers killed, 25;
enlisted men killed, 257; total, 282;
officers wounded, 115; enlisted men
wounded, 1,464; total, 1,579. Of the
wounded, 12; died; 67; died as
result of wounds; 1; invalid from ser-
vice; 6; total, 31.

It will be observed that while our
navy was engaged in two great battles
and in numerous perilous undertak-
ings, in blockade and bombardment,
and more than 50,000 of our troops were
transported to distant lands and were
engaged in assault and sieges and bat-
tles, and many skirmishes in unfamiliar
territory, we lost in both arms of the
service a total of 1,685 killed and
wounded; and in the entire campaign
by land and sea we did not lose a gun
or a flag or a transport or a ship, and
the exception of the crew of the
Merrimac not a soldier or sailor was
taken prisoner.

On August 7, 46 days after the date
of the landing of Gen. Shafter's army

in Cuba and 21 days from the surren-
der of Santiago, the United States
troops commenced embarkation for
home and our entire force was returned
to the United States as early as
August 24. There were absent from the
United States only two months.

It is fitting that I should bear testi-
mony to the patriotism and devotion
of that large portion of our army
which, although eager to be ordered to
the post of greater exposure, fortu-
nately was not required outside of the
United States. They did their whole
duty, and like their comrades at the
front, have earned the gratitude of the
nation, in like manner, the officers and
men of the army and of the navy who
remained in their departments and
stations faithfully performing most
important duties connected with the
war, and whose requests for assign-
ment in the field and at sea I was com-
pelled to refuse because their services
were indispensable here, are entitled to
the highest commendation. It is my
regret that there seems to be no suit-
able provision for their recognition.

SPANISH REQUESTS FOR PEACE.
In this connection it is a pleasure for
me to mention in terms of cordial ap-
preciation the timely and useful work
of the American National Red Cross,
both in relief measures preparatory to
the campaigns, in sanitary assistance
at several of the camps of occupation,
and in the relief of the able and expe-
rienced leadership of the president of
the society, Miss Clara Barton, in the
fields of battle and in the hospitals at
the front in Cuba. Working in con-
junction with the governmental author-
ities and under their sanction and
approval, and with the enthusiastic
co-operation of many patriotic women
and societies in the various States,
the Red Cross has fully maintained its
already high reputation for intelli-
gence, energy and ability to execute the
noble purposes of its international or-
ganization, thus justifying the confi-
dence and support which it has re-
ceived at the hands of the American
people. To the members and officers
of the society, and all who aided them
in their philanthropic work, the
sincere and lasting gratitude of the
soldiers and the public is due and is
freely accorded.

In tracing these events we are con-
stantly reminded of our obligations
to the Divine Master. Of His watchful
care over us and His safe guidance, for
which the nation makes reverent ac-
knowledgment and offers humble
prayer for the continuance of His
favor.

The annihilation of Admiral Cer-
vera's fleet, followed by the capitu-
lation of Santiago, having brought to
Spanish government a realizing sense
of the hopelessness of continuing a
struggle now become wholly unequal,
and the overtures of peace through
the French ambassador, who, with the
assent of his government, had acted
as the friendly representative of Span-
ish interests during the war. On the
26th of July M. Cambon presented a
communication signed by the Duke
Almodovar, the Spanish minister of
state, inviting the United States to
state the terms upon which it would
be willing to make peace. On July 30,
by a communication addressed to the
Duke of Almodovar and handed to
him in the terms of this government
were announced, substantially as in
the protocol afterward signed. On
August 10 the Spanish reply, dated
August 7, was handed by M. Cambon
to the secretary of state. It accepted
unconditionally the terms imposed on
Cuba, Porto Rico and an island of
the Ladrone group, but appeared to
seek to introduce inadmissible reser-
vations in regard to our demand as to
the Philippine Islands. Conceiving dis-
cussion on this point could neither be
advantageous nor profitable, I directed
that in order to avoid misunderstanding,
the matter should be forthwith closed
by proposing the embodying in a
formal protocol of the terms upon
which the negotiations for peace were
conducted. The value and im-
plicit suggestions of the Spanish
reply could not be accepted, the only
reply being to present as a virtual
ultimatum a draft or protocol embody-
ing the precise terms tendered to Spain
in our note of July 30, with the ad-
dition of a clause of detente as to the
appointment of commissioners to arrange
for the evacuation of the Spanish An-
tilles.

A PROTOCOL SIGNED.
On August 12 M. Cambon announced
his receipt of full powers to sign the
protocol so submitted. Accordingly, on
the afternoon of August 12, M. Cam-
bon, as the plenipotentiary of Spain,
and Secretary of State, as the plenipo-
tentiary of the United States, signed a
protocol providing for the evacuation of
the island of Cuba, Porto Rico and an
island of the Ladrone group, and for
the evacuation of the Spanish An-
tilles.

Article 1. Spain will relinquish all
claim of sovereignty over and the title
to Cuba.

Article 2. Spain will cede to the
United States the island of Porto Rico
and other islands now under Spanish
possession in the West Indies, and
also an island in the Ladrone, to be
selected in the United States.

Article 3. The United States will oc-
cupy and hold the city, bay and har-
bor of Manila pending the conclusion
of the peace which shall determine
the control, disposition and govern-
ment of the Philippines.

The fourth article provided for the
appointment of joint commissions on
the part of the United States and
Spain, to meet in Havana and San
Juan, respectively, for the purpose
of arranging and carrying out the de-
tails of stipulated evacuation of Cuba,
Porto Rico and other Spanish islands
in the West Indies.

The fifth article provided for the ap-
pointment of not more than five com-
missioners on each side to meet at
Paris not later than October 1, and to
proceed to the negotiation and conclu-
sion of a treaty of peace, subject to
ratification according to the respective
constitutional forms of the two coun-
tries.

The sixth and last article provided
that the signature of the protocol
should be suspended and that notice
of effect should be given as soon
as possible by each government to the
commanders of its military and naval
forces.

Immediately upon the conclusion of
the protocol I issued a proclamation of
August 12 suspending hostilities on the
part of the United States. The neces-
sary orders to that end were at once
given by telegraph. The blockade of
Porto Rico was in like manner raised.
On August 18 the muster out of 100,000
volunteers, or as near that number as
was found to be practicable, was or-
dered.

**MILITARY COMMISSIONERS
NAMED.**
On December 1, 1915, officers and
men had been mustered out and dis-
charged from the service and 9,002
more will be mustered out by the 10th
of the month. Also a corresponding
number of general and general staff
officers have been honorably discharg-
ed from the service. The military com-
missioners to superintend the evacuation
of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the adjacent
islands were forthwith appointed:

For Cuba—Maj. Gen. James F.
Wade, Rear Admiral William T.
Sampson, Maj. Gen. Matthew C. Butler,
for Porto Rico, Maj. Gen. John R.
Brooke, Rear Admiral Winfield S.
Schley, Brig. Gen. Wm. G. Gordon,
who soon afterward met the Spanish
commissioners at Havana and San

Juan respectively. The Porto Rican
joint commission speedily accomplished
its task, and by the evacuation of
the island was completed. The
United States flag was raised over the
island at noon on that day. The ad-
ministration of its affairs has been
provisionally intrusted to a military
governor until the Congress shall
otherwise provide. The Cuban joint
high commission has not yet termi-
nated its labors. Owing to the difficul-
ties in the way of removing the large
numbers of Spanish troops still in
Cuba, the evacuation cannot be com-
pleted before the 1st of January next.

Pursuant to the fifth article of the
protocol, I appointed William R. Day,
late secretary of state; Cushman K.
Davis, William P. Fry and George
Gray, senators of the United States,
and Whitelaw Reid, to be the peace
commissioners on the part of the United
States. Proceeding in due season to
Paris, they met on the 1st of Octo-
ber, five commissioners similarly
appointed on the part of Spain. Their
negotiations have met with progress,
so that I trust soon to be able to
lay a definite treaty of peace before the
Senate, with a review of the steps
leading to its signature.

I do not discuss at this time the gov-
ernment or the nature of the new pro-
visions which will come to us as the
result of the war with Spain. Such
discussion will be appropriate after the
treaty of peace shall be ratified. In the
meantime and until the Congress has
legislated otherwise, it will be my duty
to conduct the military government of
Cuba and have pacified the island it
will be necessary to give aid and di-
rection to its people to form a govern-
ment for themselves. This should be
undertaken at the earliest moment
consistent with safety to our interests.
It is important that our rela-
tions with this people should be of
the most friendly character, and our
commercial relations close and recip-
rocal. It should be our duty to assist
in every proper way to build up the
waste places of Cuba, to encourage
the industry of the people, and assist
them to form a government which
shall be free and independent, thus
realizing the best aspirations of the Cu-
ban people.